

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 5666

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION III

1. NO ALLY HAS YET PROPOSED ANY CHANGES OR AMENDMENTS IN THE US AND FRG PAPERS ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION III, WHICH WERE INTRODUCED IN THE SPC OCTOBER 2. INTERNATIONAL STAFF ACCORDINGLY HAS NOW ISSUED A DRAFT ALLIANCE PAPER, CONSISTING OF THESE TWO PAPERS WITH MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES TO FIT USUAL FORMAT, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH US AND FRG REPS. WE SHALL REFERENCE THIS DRAFT PAPER IN REPORTING ANY COMMENT IN SPC ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT PAPER:

MBFR: PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, TO KEEP DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE CONFIDENTIAL. STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS REGARDING THE DETAILS OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE, SECRET

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OR REGARDING THE DETAILS OF DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST, WOULD VIOLATE UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE EAST REGARDING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WOULD ALSO BE CONTRARY TO ALLIED INTEREST IN THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY PROVOKE PUBLIC

COUNTER-REACTIONS FROM THE EAST, RESULTING IN A POSSIBLE HARDENING OF POSITION, A DELAY IN THE CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE WHICH THE ALLIES SEEK, AND A DIMINUTION OF THE CHANCES THAT SUCH A RESPONSE WOULD BE POSITIVE.

2. NEVERTHELESS, SERIOUS PRESS LEAKS REGARDING THE CONTENT OF CURRENT INTERNAL ALLIED DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED AND MAY CONTINUE. FROM WHAT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE WESTERN PRESS, INTERESTED OBSERVERS ARE ALREADY IN A POSITION TO PIECE TOGETHER A REASONABLY ACCURATE PICTURE OF THE FORTHCOMING ALLIED PROPOSAL. ONCE THE ALLIED PROPOSAL IS PUT FORWARD IN VIENNA, PRESS INTEREST WILL INCREASE, AND IT WILL BECOME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN COMPLETE CONFIDENTIALITY.

3. IN THIS SITUATION, ALLIED OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH THE PRESS MAY BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN A "NO COMMENT" POSTURE. SERIOUS QUESTIONS MAY BE RAISED IN THE PRESS AND IN THE MINDS OF THE PUBLIC OVER THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED SECURITY OF THE NUCLEAR PROPOSAL. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DEAL IN A POSITIVE WAY WITH THESE CONCERNS. HOWEVER, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, ANY RESPONSE SHOULD BE LOW-KEY IN NATURE, CALCULATED TO AVOID EXTENSIVE PUBLIC COMMENT OR DEBATE.

4. SPECIFICALLY, ALLIED SPOKESMEN MAY NEED TO DEAL WITH POSSIBLE CONCERNS:

(A) THAT THE ALLIES ARE DEPARTING FROM THEIR BASIC APPROACH OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND INCREASING ALLIED SECURITY THROUGH REDUCING OR ELIMINATING THE MANPOWER/TANK DISPARITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN FAVOUR OF SOME OTHER CONCEPT;

(B) THAT THE ALLIES HAVE ACCEPTED THE EASTERN POSITION THAT ALL TYPES OF FORCES SHOULD BE PROPORTIONATELY REDUCED;

(C) THAT ALLIED SECURITY MAY BE SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED THROUGH US NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE ALLIES ARE NOT REQUIRING CORRESPONDING EASTERN REDUCTIONS IN SUCH FORCE ELEMENTS;

(D) THAT THE ALLIED STRATEGY OF DETERRING WAR THROUGH SECRET

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MAINTAINING FLEXIBLE RESPONSE CAPABILITY MAY BE WEAKENED OR UNDERMINED;

(E) THAT THE US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE MAY BE REDUCED AND THE "LINK" TO THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT WEAKENED.

5. THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF PRESS INTEREST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE VIENNA, AS IT HAS BEEN HERETOFORE. WORKING WITHIN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF COUNCIL GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER, THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP, AS NEEDED, APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE FOR ITS SPOKESMEN. ALLIED SPOKESMEN IN BRUSSELS AND IN CAPITALS WILL ALSO NEED TO BE IN A POSITION TO DEAL WITH PRESS ENQUIRIES. NONETHELESS, THE ALLIES DO NOT NOW DESIRE

TO ENTER INTO A PUBLIC DEBATE WITH THE EAST ON MBFR PROPOSALS OR PRESENT A NATO WHITE PAPER ON THE ALLIED POSITION, PARTICULARLY THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE . THEREFORE, ALLIED PRESS SPOKESMEN SHOULD NOT BE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON THIS GUIDANCE UNTIL THE AD HOC GROUP HAS JUDGED THAT THERE IS A NEED TO DO SO, THE TIMING IS CORRECT AND DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS WILL NOT PREJUDICE A CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE; AND UNTIL THE COUNCIL HAS CONFIRMED THE JUDGEMENT OF THE AD HOC GROUP. FINALLY, THE ALLIES DO WISH TO REASSURE WESTERN PUBLICS THAT THE NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT JEOPARDISE WESTERN SECURITY IF, REPEAT IF, TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN REDUCTIONS THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED. HOWEVER, IN MAKING SUCH REASSURANCES, WESTERN PRESS SPOKESMEN SHOULD NOT DEPRECATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS.

II. ELEMENTS OF A PRESS STATEMENT

WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF SECTION I ABOVE, ALLIED SPOKESMEN MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE:

(A) THE PRIMARY ALLIED OBJECTIVE AS TO THE OUTCOME OF MBFR CONTINUES TO BE THE REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS THROUGH THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND AGREEMENT IN PHASE I TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON THE GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES. THIS DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES IS THE MOST DESTABILISING FEATURE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE; ITS REDUCTION WOULD LESSEN THE RISK OF WAR, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WAR, IN EUROPE.

(B) THE ALLIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT
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ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS MUST BE PROPORTIONATELY REDUCED. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD LEAVE INTACT THE CURRENT DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES, THOUGH AT LOWER LEVELS, THEREBY DIMINISHING NATO SECURITY.

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(C) AFTER EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR, THE ALLIES HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT. THIS PROPOSAL INVOLVES THE WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS FROM EUROPE, INCLUDING SOME US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, SOME US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT, AND SOME US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE PERSHING MISSILE LAUNCHERS. IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING TO BE REACHED IN PHASE II BE EXTENDED TO COVER AIR AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

(D) THIS INITIATIVE IS A ONE-TIME OFFER AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT. TAKEN TOGETHER WITH PREVIOUS ALLIED PROPOSALS, IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT EASTERN CONCERNS THAT AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.

(E) IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF THESE US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, THE ALLIED OFFER IS A WEIGHTY ONE. THE ALLIES ARE CONFIDENT THAT ITS SIGNIFICANCE WILL NOT BE OVERLOOKED BY THE EAST IF THE EAST IS TRULY INTERESTED IN PURSUING
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PRACTICAL MEASURES OF DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD IN EUROPE AND IS INTERESTED IN REACHING A SUBSTANTIAL AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF WAR IN EUROPE.

(F) THE NEW ALLIED PROPOSALS ARE REALISTIC AND SOUND, IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECTS ON ALLIANCE SECURITY. IT IS THE JUDGEMENT OF ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF EASTERN AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND AGREEMENT TO A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER AS THE OUTCOME OF MBFR, THE PROPOSED ALLIED REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT DIMINISH NATO SECURITY. AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE MAKES POSSIBLE A REDUCTION OF SOME US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. BUT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT US TACTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DETERRENT AGAINST A SOVIET ATTACK, THE ALLIANCE MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE AREA.

(G) IF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF US GROUND FORCES AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TAKE PLACE, NATO WOULD RETAIN FULLY ADEQUATE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER WAR IN EUROPE THROUGH THE AGREED NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THIS STRATEGY WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE BASIS OF ALLIED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN

WESTERN EUROPE.

(H) THE US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENCE OF ITS ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE REMAINS FIRM AND UNCHANGED. THE US WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN IN EUROPE LARGE AND HIGHLY CAPABLE FORCES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR. THIS LARGE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES DEMONSTRATES US RESOLVE TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE ALLIES IN THE DEFENCE OF THE NATO AREA. MOREOVER, THIS COMMITMENT IS BACKED BY LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT CAN REINFORCE EUROPE, AND ULTIMATELY BY THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT.

(I) THE ALLIES EXPECT THE EAST TO MAKE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THIS IMPORTANT INITIATIVE AND TO AGREE TO ADDRESS ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

III. CONTINGENCY ARGUMENTS FOR USE WITH PUBLIC

WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF SECTION I ABOVE, ALLIED SPOKESMEN ARE AUTHORISED TO DRAW, AS NECESSARY, ON THE FOLLOWING CONTINGENCY ARGUMENTS IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC AND IN GIVING BACKGROUND TALKS. THE ARGUMENTS ARE ARRANGED UNDER NINE MAJOR POINTS:

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(A) PURPOSE OF NUCLEAR PROPOSAL:

- THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT ON A BALANCED, AND THEREFORE MORE STABLE, MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE.
- NATO REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THE MAJOR DESTABILISING FACTOR FOR THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE EASTERN GROUND FORCE PREPONDERANCE, PARTICULARLY IN MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE ALLIANCE THEREFORE MAINTAINS ITS VIEW THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST BRING ABOUT APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, WHILE PROVIDING FOR A REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.
- THIS - AND THIS ONLY - IS THE PURPOSE OF THE OFFER TO REDUCE CERTAIN US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. IT IS TRUE THAT THE EAST FROM THE VERY BEGINNING PROPOSED A PROPORTIONATE ACROSS-THE-BOARD-REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD LEAVE INTACT THE CURRENT DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES, THOUGH AT LOWER LEVELS, THEREBY DIMINISHING NATO SECURITY. THE ALLIES CONSIDER SUCH AN APPROACH UNACCEPTABLE.
- THE ALLIES INITIATIVE IS A ONE-TIME OFFER AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS ONE-TIME OFFER, AND AS FAR AS IT GOES, THE WEST DOES, HOWEVER, TAKE THE EASTERN POSITION INTO ACCOUNT.

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(B) INCENTIVE NATURE OF OFFER:

THE ALLIANCE PURSUES ITS ORIGINAL AIM OF BRINGING ABOUT THROUGH MBFR A BALANCED GROUNDFORCE RELATIONSHIP. THE NUCLEAR OFFER SERVES AS AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE JUST THIS. THUS THE ALLIANCE DID NOT ACCEPT THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF GENERALLY INCLUDING NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS. RATHER, THE ALLIED NUCLEAR OFFER IS DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN PROPOSAL OF ESTABLISHING A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING. IN OTHER WORDS, IT SHOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT NOW FOR THE EAST TO BLOCK THE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH REFUSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE GROUND FORCE PARITY.

(C) EXCLUSION OF EUROPEAN SYSTEMS:

A REDUCTION OF NON-US ALLIED NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE INCLUSION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS IN REDUCTIONS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE. THEREFORE, THERE WILL BE NO NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS ON NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS OR ON EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

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(D) LIMITS OF OFFER:

THE NUCLEAR OFFER IS VALID PROVIDED THE EAST SHOWS ITSELF READY TO AGREE TO THE ALLIED PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH APPROXIMATE GROUND FORCE PARITY, AND ONLY IN THAT EVENT. IT IS THEREFORE A ONE-TIME OFFER WHICH CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS INDICATING A TREND TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISENGAGEMENT. THE REDUCTIONS OFFERED WOULD ONLY CONCERN SOME NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AND THESE WOULD ONLY BE DECREASED BY A CERTAIN CALCULATED AMOUNT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT NUCLEAR DEFENCE AND ENSURE ITS EFFECTIVENESS

WILL NOT BE JEOPARDISED; FURTHERMORE, EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR DEFENCE WILL NOT BE CHANGED.

(E) CONTINUATION OF NUCLEAR SHARING:

WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, CARE HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE US'S EUROPEAN ALLIES IN NUCLEAR DEFENCE - SOMETIMES CALLED "NUCLEAR SHARING" - WILL REMAIN AS IT IS. THE NON-US NUCLEAR UNITS WILL FULLY MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT FUNCTION AND EFFECTIVENESS.

(F) CONTINUATION OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE:

IF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF US GROUND FORCES AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TAKE PLACE, NATO WOULD RETAIN FULLY ADEQUATE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER WAR IN EUROPE THROUGH THE AGREED NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THIS STRATEGY, CONSISTING OF THE TRIAD OF NATO DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL, TACTICAL-NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC - WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE BASIS OF ALLIED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE.

(G) ABSENCE OF ANY "STRATEGIC DECOUPLING":

THE US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENCE OF ITS ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE REMAINS FIRM AND UNCHANGED. THE US WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN IN EUROPE LARGE AND HIGHLY CAPABLE FORCES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR. THIS LARGE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES DEMONSTRATES US RESOLVE TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE ALLIES IN THE DEFENCE OF THE NATO AREA. MOREOVER, THIS COMMITMENT IS BACKED BY LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT CAN REINFORCE EUROPE, AND ULTIMATELY BY THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT. THEREFORE, THE OFFER TO REDUCE CERTAIN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WILL NOT LEAD TO A "DECOUPLING" OF THE ESCALATORY CONNECTION OF NATO'S DETERRENCE, NOR WILL IT AFFECT THE NATO "TRIAD" OF DEFENCE.

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(H) CONTINUED TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET IR/MRBM'S:

THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING OFFER DOES NOT PUT INTO QUESTION THE PRESENT COVERAGE OF THOSE SOVIET IR/MRBM'S WHICH ARE TARGETED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE.

(I) REASONS FOR LACK OF FULL RECIPROCITY:

- REPEAT ANSWER (A) ABOVE
- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NATO'S OBJECTIVE IN PROPOSING TO REDUCE CERTAIN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE REDUCTIONS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE WILL BE DIFFERENT IN SOME RESPECTS ON EACH SIDE. THIS IS BECAUSE THE WEST IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH THE EASTERN GROUND FORCE PREPONDERANCE, PARTICULARLY IN MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS, AND SEEKS AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD RESULT IN APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND A REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.
- ONE MAY SAID THAT MBFR AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO REDUCE SOVIET NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY THE SAME TOKEN, NATO DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OUTSIDE THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE REDUCED EITHER. END TEXT OF DRAFT

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